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The	real	Brexit	‘dividend’:	a	decade	of	economic
underperformance	and	political	crisis
Contrary	to	some	predictions,	Britain’s	economy	has	not	crashed	in	the	two	years	since	the	EU
referendum.	But	growth	has	slowed	markedly,	productivity	is	down,	and	investment	is	on	hold.	Dimitri
Zenghelis	looks	at	the	effect	the	prolonged	uncertainty	about	future	trade	arrangements	is	having	on
the	economy.
In	September	2016,	a	few	months	after	the	UK	referendum	vote	to	leave	the	European	Union,	I	argued
in	this	blog	that	it	was	too	soon	to	judge	the	impact	on	the	UK	economy.	At	that	time,	GDP	growth	was
accelerating	and	I	warned	it	was	too	early	to	talk	of	a	Brexit	boost.	Almost	two	years	on,	the	time	is	ripe	to	revisit	the
data	and	make	a	more	informed	assessment	of	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	trajectory	of	the	UK	economy.
It	is	important	at	the	outset	to	distinguish	between	the	impact	of	the	Brexit	vote,	and	the	negotiations	that	have
followed,	from	the	impact	of	Brexit	itself,	noting	that	the	latter	has	yet	to	happen.	On	first	pass,	the	much-vaunted
post-referendum	economic	crash	turned	out	to	be	the	dog	that	never	barked.	UK	GDP	growth	has	held	up	and	the
economy	has	not	slipped	into	recession.	More	people	are	in	work	than	ever	before.	According	to	the	latest	figures,
the	UK	employment	rate	stood	at	75.6%	in	Feb-April,	the	joint	highest	since	comparable	records	began	in	1971.
Tabloid	headlines	vaunting	a	‘Brexit	boom’	seem	far-fetched,	but	the	resilience	of	the	UK	economy	has	surprised
some,	especially	compared	to	many	dire	forecasts	made	prior	to	the	referendum.
Yet	closer	examination	of	the	evidence	paints	a	far	less	rosy	picture.	It	is	of	course	impossible	to	know	how	the
economy	would	have	fared	in	the	absence	of	a	vote	to	leave	the	EU	as	we	have	no	observable	counterfactual.	Yet
UK	growth	has	slowed	markedly	since	the	referendum	in	2016,	over	a	period	when	the	rest	of	the	global	economy
has	boomed.	The	UK	has	gone	from	top	of	the	G7	growth	league	in	2015	to	likely	bottom	in	2018.	All	else	equal,
growth	in	the	UK	economy	should	have	accelerated	and	not	slowed	over	this	period.	World	growth	increased	in	2017
to	3.8	percent,	with	a	notable	rebound	in	global	trade	which	is	expected	to	endure	through	2018.	At	the	same	time
the	Bank	of	England	loosened	policy,	and	the	Treasury	soft-pedalled	on	fiscal	policy.	Yet	despite	this,	something
seems	to	be	acting	as	a	powerful	drag	on	UK	growth	and	this	is	consistent	with	a	negative	Brexit	effect.
The	boost	to	employment	ought	to	be	welcome,	and	such	an	occurrence	is	normally	associated	with	a	strong
economic	recovery	and	a	rise	in	consumption.	But	looking	behind	the	numbers	it	is	clear	that	strong	employment
growth	has	coincided	with	weak	output	growth,	such	that	output	per	worker	has	stagnated.	Figures	published	by
the	ONS	earlier	this	month	showed	that	productivity	fell	0.4	per	cent	in	the	first	quarter	of	the	year	and	was	only	0.9
per	cent	higher	than	a	year	earlier.	A	lot	of	the	employment	turns	out	to	have	been	part-time	and	low	wage.
Low	productivity	growth	combined	with	the	post-referendum	depreciation	of	the	pound,	which	correspondingly
pushed	up	import	costs,	have	squeezed	British	real	wages	and	purchasing	power.	Indeed,	according	to	the	OECD,
the	UK	had	the	weakest	wage	growth	of	any	G7	country	over	the	past	decade.	UK	real	wages	contracted	by	an
average	annual	rate	of	0.3	per	cent,	the	worst	performance	of	all	34	OECD	countries,	with	the	exception	of	Greece
and	Mexico.
The	Financial	Times	estimates	that	0.9	per	cent	of	annual	national	income	has	been	forgone	relative	to	what	was
possible	if	the	country	had	voted	to	stay	in	the	EU.	By	fortuitous	coincidence	this	equates	to	£350m	a	week,	precisely
the	figure	emblazoned	on	the	side	of	the	Brexiters	campaign	bus,	touted	as	the	so-called	‘Brexit	dividend’	available
for	immediate	investment	in	the	NHS.
Making	labour	more	productive	requires	investment,	yet	total	and	business	investment	fell	in	the	latest	quarter	of	the
year,	and	rose	only	1.5	per	cent	over	the	same	period	the	previous	year,	the	weakest	performance	of	all
the	G7	economies.	Lower	investment	reduces	GDP	growth	today,	but	it	also	cuts	capacity	for	future	economic
expansion	because	generating	growth	is	what	investment	does.	The	fall	in	business	investment	is	likely	driven	by	two
Brexit-related	causes.	The	first	is	greater	uncertainty	surrounding	the	political	and	economic	environment	post-
referendum.	The	second	is	the	average	expectation	that,	whatever	form	Brexit	takes,	it	will	likely	involve	some
reduction	in	access	to	markets,	capital	and	skilled	labour,	making	the	UK	a	less	attractive	place	to	invest.	Both	put	off
investors.
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A	recent	survey	of	600	Eurozone	corporations	by	UBS	found	that	over	three-quarters	of	companies	headquartered	in
EU	countries	plan	to	move	at	least	some	of	their	investments	out	of	the	UK	as	a	result	of	Brexit.	More	than	one	tenth
had	stated	an	intention	to	leave	the	UK	entirely.	According	to	the	Society	of	Motor	Manufacturers	and	Traders,	the
industry	lobby	group,	investment	in	Britain’s	car	industry	has	halved,	reflecting	uncertainty	about	the	UK’s	future
relationship	with	Europe.	The	Bank	of	England	estimates	that	UK	nominal	business	investment	is	already	at	least	3-
4ppts	below	what	it	would	have	been	without	the	Brexit	vote.
The	bottom	line	is	the	UK	cannot	sustain	growth	in	living	standards	without	productivity	growth,	and	productivity
growth	depends	on	investment	in	machines	and	people.	Which	brings	us	to	the	second	question:	what	are	the
prospects	post-Brexit?	This	is	much	harder	to	answer,	not	least	because	we	will	still	don’t	know	what	kind	of	Brexit	(if
any)	will	be	finally	negotiated.	Even	if	we	did,	economists	are	notoriously	bad	at	predicting	the	long	run	impact	of	out-
of-sample,	non-marginal	changes	to	an	economy’s	underlying	structure.	Will	reduced	access	to	cheap	labour	force
productivity	enhancing	automation?	Will	removing	business	burdens	allow	the	UK	to	shave	costs	and	retain	a
competitive	edge?	Will	removing	technocratic	constraints	give	the	UK	policy	flexibility	to	support	the	economy?
On	the	face	of	it,	tighter	controls	on	immigration	may	encourage	greater	capital	investment	in	automation	and	efforts
to	enhance	the	skills	of	British	workers	to	offset	reduced	access	to	cheap	foreign	labour.	This	could	boost	labour
productivity	and	wages.	Indeed,	staff	at	the	Bank	of	England	have	suggested	this	process	may	have	already	begun.
However,	this	seems	at	odds	with	ONS	findings	that	companies	that	import	and	export	heavily	tend	to	have
significantly	higher	than	average	productivity,	suggesting	that	open	borders	induce	greater	efficiency.	Moreover,	to
the	extent	that	a	weaker	pound	has	lowered	UK	real	wages	relative	to	other	inputs,	such	as	materials,	components
and	finance	capital,	firms	would	be	expected	to	shift	to	less	productive	labour-intensive	activities.
Loosening	labour	and	environmental	regulations	may	look	to	some	like	an	easy	way	to	cut	costs	for	business,	but	it	is
unlikely	to	build	UK	competitiveness	in	the	modern	economy.	UK	and	global	manufacturers	will	likely	choose	to	set
standards	which	allow	access	to	the	far	bigger	EU	market.	Moreover,	there	is	a	large	and	growing	body	of
evidence	showing	that	tighter	environmental	standards	induce	innovation,	attract	capital	and	draw	in	skilled
workers	to	meet	rising	global	demand	for	renewables	and	energy	efficiency.
Yet	some	immediate	effects	of	Brexit	can	be	quantified	with	greater	confidence.	Perhaps	the	most	robustly	and
rigorously	tested	model	in	economics	is	the	gravity	model.	This	tells	us	that	trade	between	two	countries	is
proportional	to	size,	measured	by	GDP,	and	inversely	proportional	to	the	geographic	distance	between	them.
As	Theresa	May	accurately	reported	before	the	referendum	vote,	this	is	why	“we	export	more	to	Ireland	than	we	do
to	China,	almost	twice	as	much	to	Belgium	as	we	do	to	India,	and	nearly	three	times	as	much	to	Sweden	as	we	do	to
Brazil”.
Throwing	up	obstructions	to	trade	with	all	our	closest	neighbours	will	be	predictably	costly.	Trade	means	greater
competition,	which	encourages	British	firms	to	improve	efficiency.	It	also	allows	the	UK	to	specialise	in	sectors	where
it	has	a	comparative	advantage,	benefiting	from	economies	of	scale	in	supplying	large	global	markets.	The	effects	of
lower	immigration	on	GDP	and	the	public	finances	are	also	predictable.	Immigrants	tend	to	be	younger	and	more
economically	active	than	the	average	citizen,	and	therefore	make	net	contributions	to	GDP	and	the	public	finances.
The	government’s	own	numbers	show	national	income	would	be	8%	lower	under	a	no	deal	scenario,	around	5%
lower	under	a	UK-EU	free	trade	agreement	and	2%	lower	under	a	‘soft	Brexit’	with	single	market	membership	over	a
15-year	period.	Indeed,	this	is	based	on	the	implausible	assumption	that	trading	outside	the	EU	customs	union	and
single	market	is	going	to	be	frictionless.	Other	independent	economic	studies	have	shown	similar	or	worse	impacts.
Most	reasonable	Brexiters	expect	some	economic	transition	cost,	but	they	argue	either	that	this	is	worthwhile	to	meet
other	cultural	aims,	or	that	it	will	be	limited	and	temporary	(or	both).	This	may	be	so,	but	it	remains	the	case	that
many	Leave	voters	believed	they	would	be	at	least	no	worse	off	after	Brexit,	which	is	why	Brexiters	put	so	much
effort	into	downplaying	the	economic	impact.
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Looking	ahead,	the	prospects	are	not	encouraging.	The	‘agreement’	at	Chequers	and	subsequent	ministerial
resignations	reflect	the	fact	that	the	time	for	appeasing	Eurosceptic	conservatives	with	vague	language,	while
postponing	detailed	outlines	of	a	workable	Brexit	plan,	has	run	out.	The	resignations	reflected	the	inevitable
acceptance	that	the	UK	is	heading	towards	some	form	of	‘Brexit	In	Name	Only’,	whereby	the	UK	is	a	de	facto	EU
member,	paying	into	the	budget	and	subscribing	to	the	rules,	but	without	representation	or	influence.	One	of	the	few
things	Remainers	and	Leavers	see	eye-to-eye	on	is	that	this	is	deeply	unsatisfactory.	This	makes	it	an	inherently
unstable	position.	Yet	the	alternatives	of	No	Deal	(or	even	a	‘Canada	deal’)	or	remaining	in	the	EU	are,	respectively,
too	costly—especially	as	the	UK	has	made	no	preparations	for	it—or	politically	toxic	in	the	absence	of	a	mandate
from	a	new	referendum.
This	means	the	coming	years	are	likely	to	be	defined	by	a	continued	and	profound	uncertainty	over	Britain’s	future
trade	and	investment	climate,	with	enduring	political	tension	over	the	destination.	Until	the	terms	of	Brexit	are	known,
companies	will	continue	to	defer	investment.	Even	once	terms	are	agreed,	the	resulting	reallocation	of	resources	to
reflect	new	comparative	advantages,	trading	partners	and	production	patterns,	is	likely	to	prove	costly	and	hold	back
productivity	growth.	In	short,	barring	a	vote	to	remain	in	the	European	Union,	Britain	faces	the	prospect	of	a	lost
decade	of	economic	underperformance,	subdued	wage	growth	and	investment	and,	increasingly,	political	crisis.
_______
Note:	This	post	was	originally	published	on	the	LSE	Brexit	blog.	
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